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As climate change threatens coastal areas with more frequent and intense
flooding, the federal government has adopted a greater focus on mitigating the effects of natural disasters. While neighborhoods differ in terms of physical risk exposure, they also differ in social vulnerability—the characteristics that influence a
community’s ability to safely weather a storm, withstand disruptions to employment
and housing, navigate the rebuilding process, and eventually return to normal.
Funding for federal flood-mitigation projects administered by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is currently distributed according to a
simple metric—the benefits of a project must outweigh its costs. FEMA’s approach
to cost-benefit analysis (CBA), however, primarily measures physical risk to property
while neglecting the long-term, intangible social costs incurred by vulnerable communities. This approach has resulted in higher-property-value communities receiving a disproportionate share of mitigation infrastructure, while lower-income communities are either left without protection or relocated. The distribution of
mitigation funding therefore plays a role in exacerbating place-based inequality.
This Comment proposes ways in which FEMA could better account for the distributional effects of its projects and promote efficient policies that take into account
the full range of social and economic costs associated with natural disasters. It begins by detailing how FEMA neglects to consider distributional outcomes in its mitigation programs, consistent with the single-minded focus on economic efficiency
prevalent in federal regulatory decision-making. Next, it surveys empirical research
documenting the ways in which FEMA’s use of CBA exacerbates wealth inequality
and social vulnerability to flooding. The Comment then considers various legal avenues for redressing the disparate impacts resulting from FEMA’s policies, concluding that none are likely to be successful. Instead, it offers five policy adjustments that
FEMA could implement in its cost-benefit methodology to ensure that resources for
flood mitigation are more equitably distributed, emphasizing ways in which these
better accord with the agency’s own focus on economic efficiency.
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INTRODUCTION
In August 2017, Hurricane Harvey hit Harris County, Texas,
causing $125 billion in damages and flooding 150,000 homes.1
Harvey was the most intense hurricane ever recorded in U.S. history in terms of duration and peak rainfall and the deadliest hurricane to hit Texas in almost a century.2 More than four years
later, the recovery process continues, including efforts to mitigate
the impacts of future disasters.
After Hurricane Harvey, the Harris County judge and commissioners called for a special election to issue $2.5 billion in
bonds to finance flood-damage-reduction projects.3 In 2018, the
1
JIM BLACKBURN & PHILIP B. BEDIENT, JAMES A. BAKER III INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y
RICE UNIV., HOUSTON A YEAR AFTER HARVEY: WHERE WE ARE AND WHERE WE NEED
TO BE 3 (2018).
2
Fast Facts: Hurricane Costs, OFF. FOR COASTAL MGMT., https://perma.cc/7A7K-ZWJK.
3
BLACKBURN & BEDIENT, supra note 1, at 3. The Commissioners Court, headed by
the county judge, is the governing body of Harris County and oversees the Harris County
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measure passed. Citing a provision in the bond measure that required the creation of “a process for the equitable expenditure of
Bond Program funds,” the court adopted a new framework for deciding which projects would be completed first.4 Rather than
simply prioritizing projects that protected the highest-value property, as the county had historically done, the county now scored
projects across several criteria, measuring existing conditions, expected risk reduction, cost, availability of funding, and environmental and recreational benefits.5 Most controversially, the
county also weighed the social vulnerability of the neighborhood
where a project was to be built as 20% of the project score.6 This
social vulnerability factor incorporated demographic characteristics “that influence a community’s ability to prepare for, respond
to, and recover from a disaster.”7
The inclusion of the Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) in the
prioritization framework quickly generated debate. Advocates applauded the change as necessary to redress a long history of federal flood funds being directed toward wealthier neighborhoods.8
Under the new method, projects proposed in neighborhoods with
more socially vulnerable residents would likely move up the priority list. Conversely, the new prioritization framework engendered harsh criticism from upper-income communities whose
Flood Control District, among other duties. See About: Judge Lina Hidalgo, LINA
HIDALGO, HARRIS CNTY. JUDGE, https://perma.cc/GAH3-KL53. Flood-damage-reduction
projects authorized by the bond measure include “purchasing lands, easements, rights-ofway and structures, and [ ] the acquisition and construction of improvements, including
detention basins, channel modifications and other works suitable for use in connection
with flood damage reduction.” HARRIS CNTY., TEX., BUDGET MGMT. DEP’T, ORDER CALLING
HARRIS COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT BOND ELECTION, PROPOSITION A (2018).
4
LINA HIDALGO, HARRIS CNTY. COMM’RS CT., PROPOSED AGENDA ITEM AND
ATTACHED RESOLUTION (2019).
5
See HARRIS CNTY. FLOOD CONTROL DIST., FINAL PRIORITIZATION FRAMEWORK FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HARRIS COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT 2018 BOND
PROJECTS 2 (2019).
6
See id. at 6.
7
Id. at 4. To measure social vulnerability, Harris County adopted the Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) developed by the CDC, which incorporates fifteen Census variables
such as “percentage of elderly residents, limited English proficiency, [and] households
without a vehicle.” Id.; see also CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC SOCIAL
VULNERABILITY INDEX (CDC SVI), https://perma.cc/8MDQ-KLYA.
8
See Christopher Flavelle, A Climate Plan in Texas Focuses on Minorities. Not
Everyone Likes It., N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/GCG2-59DM. The bond
measure recognized that project selection “may have been affected in the past and may
continue to be affected by eligibility requirements for matching Federal, State, and other
local government funds” and permitted the Court “to expend proceeds of the Bonds without
regard to the eligibility requirements for matching federal, state and other local funds.”
HARRIS CNTY., TEX., BUDGET MGMT. DEP’T, supra note 3, § 14(g)–(h).
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projects were bumped down in priority. These opponents saw the
SVI as improperly grafting socioeconomic concerns onto what was
essentially an engineering problem or as an effort by elected officials
to co-opt tax dollars to win over lower-income constituencies.9
The debate underway in Houston is likely to crop up throughout the country as rising sea levels threaten a greater number of
communities due to climate change. Economic losses from stormrelated wind and flooding are expected to total $54 billion per
year under current conditions, with an annual cost of $17 billion
to the federal government.10 And with this increase in risk, inequalities in vulnerability to extreme flooding that are tied to
historic patterns of disinvestment and segregation will inevitably be exposed.
These inequities have been created in part by the federal government’s practice of funding flood-mitigation projects on the
basis of cost-benefit analysis (CBA).11 The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), for instance, requires that projects
funded through its hazard-mitigation programs produce benefits
outweighing the costs.12 The agency’s methodology for calculating
costs and benefits captures direct loss of property and life, but it
is less successful at estimating the indirect burdens that natural
disasters impose on vulnerable communities and the government.
Following the agency’s methodology, the value of property and
other benefits protected by a sea wall, drainage project, or other
flood-prevention mechanism must be greater than the cost to construct such infrastructure.13 Under this system, areas with lower
property values are less likely to qualify for projects that are similarly priced to those built in high-property-value areas.14 For example, a $5 million seawall or drainage channel would satisfy
CBA if it protected ten $500,000 homes but not if it protected
forty-nine $100,000 homes. This practice leads to disparate results when storms hit. Greens Bayou—one of Harris County’s

9

See Flavelle, supra note 8.
CONG. BUDGET OFF., EXPECTED COSTS OF DAMAGE FROM HURRICANE WINDS AND
STORM-RELATED FLOODING 1, 4, 8 (2019).
11 For an overview of the role that CBA plays in regulatory review, see generally
Daniel H. Cole, ‘Best Practice’ Standards for Regulatory Benefit–Cost Analysis, 23 RSCH.
IN L. & ECON. 1 (2007).
12 See FEMA, HAZARD MITIGATION ASSISTANCE GUIDANCE: HAZARD MITIGATION
GRANT PROGRAM, PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION PROGRAM, AND FLOOD MITIGATION
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 21 (2015).
13 See BLACKBURN & BEDIENT, supra note 1, at 31.
14 See id.
10
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poorest areas and also one of the most impacted by Harvey—had
previously struggled to qualify for federal funding that might
have reduced the amount of damage it experienced.15 While some
state and local governments may adopt alternative metrics to distribute local funding as Harris County did, federal mitigation
funding—an essential lifeline for many communities—comes
with the cost-benefit string attached.
This Comment examines how FEMA’s use of CBA to evaluate
flood-mitigation projects results in the disproportionate protection of neighborhoods with higher property values—values that
are themselves a product of past infrastructure investment. By
conceptualizing risk primarily in terms of property damage rather than social vulnerability, FEMA fails to account for many of
the long-term costs of flooding to communities that are left unprotected. These include unemployment, homelessness, and harms
to health that result when vulnerable communities are displaced
from their homes or forced to live in unsafe conditions. This Comment argues that FEMA can better advance the goal of economic
efficiency by incorporating the full long-term costs of flooding to
vulnerable populations in its cost-benefit methodology. What’s
more, paying greater attention to the distributional impacts of its
policies will allow FEMA to uphold the distributional mandate
long espoused—but never fulfilled—by past administrations conducting regulatory review.16
Part I first contextualizes FEMA’s approach within the
broader regulatory environment, highlighting how the federal
government has neglected distributional considerations in favor
of economic efficiency. Second, it argues that applying CBA to unequal distributions of wealth can entrench inequality. Part II
then details the CBA methodology FEMA uses to award Hazard
Mitigation Assistance (HMA) grants that help communities
lessen the effects of future disasters. As currently conducted, this
methodology emphasizes physical risk while failing to account for
the disproportionately harmful impacts that natural disasters
have on low-income, minority, and otherwise socially vulnerable
communities. By failing to incorporate long-term social impacts
like homelessness, unemployment, or health-care costs that result when communities with the fewest resources to recover go
15 See id. Because Harris County raised the funds through a bond measure, it could
adopt its own criteria and was not subject to the federal government’s CBA. HARRIS CNTY.,
TEX., BUDGET MGMT. DEP’T, supra note 3, § 14(h).
16 See infra text accompanying notes 24–28.
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unprotected, FEMA’s approach may actually fail to promote costefficient investments. Further, allocating scarce government resources to those who already have the resources to easily recover
from natural disasters may widen the wealth gap and increase
disparities in vulnerability to future flooding. To provide empirical evidence of the impact of FEMA’s current approach to CBA,
Part III points to studies documenting how FEMA’s programs fail
to address—and may even exacerbate—social vulnerability to
flooding. With these effects in mind, Part IV surveys previous legal challenges to FEMA’s funding decisions and describes why
none provide promising avenues for relief. Turning instead to policy solutions, Part V proposes several adjustments to how FEMA
conducts CBA to better incorporate distributional concerns into
its flood-mitigation programs.
I. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AS A REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING
TOOL
CBA is the dominant method of reviewing proposed regulations and policies at the federal level. The government’s reliance
on CBA is primarily aimed at maximizing economic efficiency,
though federal guidance instructs that effects on vulnerable populations should play a role in the analysis. The executive branch
has repeatedly committed to analyzing the distributional effects
of its policies—considering who is benefitted, who is burdened,
and by how much—but these mandates have largely gone unheeded. This Part briefly describes the origins of CBA and how
various presidential administrations have chosen to address distributional considerations when conducting regulatory analyses.
It then discusses how the standard efficiency justification for CBA
fails to account for unequal distributions of wealth, an issue that
is consequential for FEMA’s flood-mitigation policies.
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis in Federal Regulation
The federal government’s use of CBA originated in the Flood
Control Act of 1936,17 which mandated that water-control projects
executed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers produce benefits
exceeding their costs.18 It wasn’t until the 1980s, however, that
CBA became a fixture of centralized regulatory review
17

Pub. L. No. 74-738, 49 Stat. 1570 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701a).
Don Bradford Hardin, Jr., Comment, Why Cost-Benefit Analysis? A Question (and
Some Answers) About the Legal Academy, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1135, 1143 (2008).
18

2021]

A Place Worth Protecting

1931

administered through the Office of the President. While earlier
administrations used economic analysis as one factor in evaluating agency action, the Reagan administration adopted CBA as a
strict decision rule that could make or break a proposed regulation.19 President Ronald Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291 required
that agencies promulgating “major” regulations ensure that “the
potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs.”20 The Order also placed the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) in charge of ensuring compliance with these
guidelines.21 Environmentalists and regulatory agencies have frequently cast CBA as a deregulatory tool,22 arguing that the selection of discount rates, the uncertainty of future risks, and the difficulty of assigning a value to environmental benefits and human
lives undermine CBA’s apparent objectivity.23 Nevertheless, all
administrations since President Reagan’s have endorsed CBA in
some form.
Subsequent Democratic administrations have nominally incorporated distributional considerations into regulatory review,
though agencies have yet to implement distributional analysis in
a systematic way.24 The Clinton administration replaced the
Reagan-era order with Executive Order 12,866, weakening CBA
from a mandatory decision rule into a single, optional factor in
the decision-making process.25 It also required that agencies consider distributive impacts and equity when choosing among

19

See Cole, supra note 11, at 5.
3 C.F.R. 128–30. Major rules were defined as those having “[a]n annual effect on
the economy of $100 million or more;” “[a] major increase in costs or prices for consumers,”
industry, or government; or “[s]ignificant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, [or] innovation.” 3 C.F.R. 127.
21 3 C.F.R. 131.
22 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1355, 1365–67, 1392 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A.
LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT
THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008)) (explaining how CBA as practiced often underestimates future harms and overestimates industry compliance costs); David M. Driesen,
Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 364–80 (2006) (analyzing
twenty-five rules reviewed by OMB between 2001 and 2002 and finding that OMB recommended weakening environmental, health, or safety protections in twenty-four out of the
twenty-five, even when the agency submitted a positive cost-benefit ratio).
23 See Cole, supra note 11, at 6–12.
24 See Lisa A. Robinson, James K. Hammitt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Attention to
Distribution in U.S. Regulatory Analyses, 10 REV. ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y 308, 316 (2016)
(“[F]ederal agencies largely ignore, and the OMB does not enforce, the guidance on distributional analysis contained in Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and OMB Circular A-4.”).
25 Cole, supra note 11, at 7.
20
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alternatives.26 Executive Order 12,866 has remained in place
since the Clinton administration, though the degree to which the
executive branch has emphasized distributional outcomes has
varied.27 President Joe Biden has taken a strong stance on the
importance of considering equity, emphasizing the role that regulatory review may play in addressing “systemic racial inequality[ ] and the undeniable reality and accelerating threat of climate change.”28 To that end, President Biden has ordered the
director of OMB to “propose procedures that take into account the
distributional consequences of regulations, including as part of
any quantitative or qualitative analysis of the costs and benefits
of regulations, to ensure that regulatory initiatives appropriately
benefit and do not inappropriately burden disadvantaged, vulnerable, or marginalized communities.”29 This suggests that the time
is ripe for addressing how FEMA’s CBA policies fail to address
many communities’ vulnerability to climate change, as Part III
describes.
Of course, federal funds are limited, and government agencies must adopt some framework for deciding where these scarce
funds are invested. CBA serves as a useful decision criterion for
identifying projects and policies that may make everyone better
off.30 However, those who defend CBA on the grounds that it maximizes economic efficiency often make unrealistic assumptions ex
ante about how the wealth produced via efficient regulations will
be redistributed. For this reason, even as CBA has grown in prominence among regulators, the methodology has been consistently
criticized by academics.

26 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994). This approach was reaffirmed under
the Obama administration. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012).
27 President George W. Bush took a primarily deregulatory stance with the appointment of John Graham as head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA),
who generally prevented the promulgation of new health standards completely. President
Barack Obama revoked President Bush’s orders and effectively reinstated President Bill
Clinton’s version of CBA. President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order adopting
the requirement that agencies repeal two existing rules for every new rule issued and
setting a regulatory budget for each agency. See Daniel A. Farber, Regulatory Review in
Anti-regulatory Times, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 383, 387–88, 400 (2019) (citing Exec. Order
No. 13,771, 3 C.F.R. 284 (2018)).
28 Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Modernizing Regulatory Review, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 20,
2021), https://perma.cc/992T-YTD5.
29 Id.
30 See, e.g., Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1649, 1694 (2018).
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B. Defenses and Critiques of Cost-Benefit Analysis
The approach to CBA required by OMB and endorsed by
FEMA is motivated by the principle that maximizing overall
wealth produces the greatest social welfare benefits. The pursuit
of efficiency is not about growing wealth for its own sake; it is
about identifying and increasing the various inputs that improve
quality of life. For efficient policies to be welfare maximizing,
however, the wealth created ought to be shared broadly.31 As the
next two sections argue, where CBA is applied to highly unequal
distributions of wealth, a single-minded focus on efficiency can
fail to improve well-being and can entrench existing inequalities.
1. The efficiency justification.
The federal government’s consistent use of CBA for evaluating
administrative action is grounded in the theory that government
regulations should maximize economic efficiency. Under this
view, agencies should adopt regulations that grow the economic
pie, such that the “winners” of a policy could compensate the
“losers” with a larger slice than under a less efficient policy.32
OMB guidance, which FEMA relies on to conduct CBA, explicitly
adopts this wealth-maximization approach: “The principle of maximizing net present value of benefits is based on the premise that
gainers could fully compensate the losers and still be better off.”33
Importantly, the guidance specifies that “[t]he presence or absence
of such compensation should be indicated in the analysis.”34
The issue is that little is known about whether redistribution
actually occurs.35 Proponents of CBA argue that even if the losers
of a particular policy are not directly compensated after its adoption, the results will ideally even out over time such that the losers
of one policy may become the winners of the next.36 However,
policy makers may place too much faith in the likelihood of
31

See id. at 1660–61.
See id. at 1652–53. This principle is called Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Id. at 1652.
Taxation is assumed to be the best method of redistributing wealth because it minimizes
the behavioral distortions—such as reducing incentives to work or producing goods that
are “too safe”—associated with redistribution through the judicial or regulatory system.
See Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics,
100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1057–58 (2016).
33 See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-94, GUIDELINES AND DISCOUNT RATES
FOR BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS 12 (2003).
34 Id.
35 See Liscow, supra note 30, at 1666.
36 Id. at 1663–64.
32
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redistribution for several reasons: legislative offsetting via the
tax system is frequently imprecise, legislatures experience inertia
or interest-group capture, and there may be high political costs to
redistribution due to conventional norms regarding fairness and
desert.37
Even if benefits are not fully redistributed, agencies might
still prefer CBA as a decision rule if it is a less costly method of
gathering and analyzing relevant information than alternative
methods.38 Additionally, CBA increases the transparency of regulatory decisions by subjecting agencies to the scrutiny of other
government supervisors and the public. This allows those impacted by agency decisions to contest the policy trade-offs or valuations made.39 However, under certain conditions, such as when
a proposed project will affect people with highly unequal levels of
wealth or who are poorly informed about the consequences, many
scholars agree that agencies should modify or depart from CBA.40
2. The wealth-effects critique.
Whether redistribution occurs matters when evaluating policies that affect populations with highly unequal wealth. Because
the welfare benefits produced by a policy do not have a market
value, agencies must estimate indirectly the price that an individual would be willing to pay to obtain them. Yet because the
marginal value of a dollar decreases with income—that is, the
wealthy value each additional dollar less than the poor do—the
wealthy will display a greater willingness to pay just by dint of
having more money to spare.41
Willingness to pay is often inferred from consumption decisions that do not align with the welfare the consumption produces.
For example, in deciding where to locate an industrial facility, a
permitting agency might infer that home values in neighborhoods
exposed to different levels of pollution “reveal” the value homeowners place on clean air. However, this metric does not capture
how much rich and poor homeowners benefit by breathing clean
air; instead, it is largely a proxy for preexisting distributions of
37

Fennell & McAdams, supra note 32, at 1083–1107.
See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109
YALE L.J. 165, 225–33 (1999).
39 Id. at 245–46.
40 Id. at 246.
41 John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis
vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1652 (2013).
38
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wealth.42 This problem recurs in the structure of many government
funding programs. For example, the Department of Transportation
requires that applicants for infrastructure grants quantify the
value of time commuters save from a transportation project based
on the incomes of those who use the mode of transit. Yet because
individuals who travel by bus tend to have lower incomes than
those who fly or use high-speed rail, time savings for bus infrastructure are lower and investments appear relatively less cost
justified.43
The difficulty of accurately capturing welfare benefits can
also be seen in FEMA’s mitigation policies. The flood-mitigation
programs operated by FEMA, described further in Part II, require
that spending on flood-mitigation projects produce equal or
greater benefits in the form of averted property damage and loss
of life. This metric would support protecting five homes worth
$1 million dollars each but not forty-nine homes worth $100,000.
Yet protecting forty-nine homeowners would almost certainly produce greater welfare benefits than protecting just five.44 Using
property value to allocate investments may therefore result in
policies that produce lesser welfare gains than otherwise possible.
When wealth effects are present and the tax system does not
effectively redistribute the monetary benefits produced by a policy, then CBA entrenches policies that benefit the rich.45 When
this is so, less efficient rules that are less biased against the poor
may be justified.46 At the very least, it seems that the distributive
effects of the policy should be made clear to facilitate review of
the trade-offs being made. However, as currently designed,
FEMA’s methodology does not sufficiently account for these types
of distributive effects, making it difficult for those impacted by its
programs to properly evaluate its policy judgments.47
CBA as conducted in federal regulatory review has the potential to identify policies that improve overall well-being if the

42

Id. at 1653–54.
Liscow, supra note 30, at 1689–91.
44 See Bronsteen et al., supra note 41, at 1652–54.
45 Liscow, supra note 30, at 1688–91. Technically, you could have a policy that is
“poor-biased” because an individual’s willingness to pay for certain goods decreases as
their income rises. For instance, building a public swimming pool in a poor neighborhood
is likely to be more efficient than the same action in a rich neighborhood. The rich are
more able to build their own private pools and, therefore, would demonstrate a lower willingness to pay for this good. These types of policies are uncommon. Id. at 1677–79.
46 Id. at 1693–1700.
47 See infra Part II.B.
43
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benefits are widely distributed. However, the difficulty of quantifying intangible benefits and the absence of redistribution mean
that CBA often allocates more benefits to those who have greater
property holdings and wealth. Having established the potential
advantages and disadvantages of CBA as a decision-making criterion, the next Part discusses the specific methodology employed
by FEMA in its flood-mitigation policies. It argues that, by prioritizing the protection of property value (a highly unequally distributed resource), FEMA’s methodology falls prey to the wealtheffects critique just described and fails to account for the broader
welfare effects of flooding.
II. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN FEMA’S MITIGATION PROGRAMS
CBA is central to FEMA’s administration of flood-mitigation
programs—those that help communities prepare for and minimize the effects of future flooding. FEMA is the primary federal
agency responsible for funding natural-disaster preparation and
response. Between 2005 and 2016, FEMA spent almost $63 billion
dollars on public sector flood-relief and mitigation projects, constituting 42% of the $143 billion paid out by all federal disaster
relief programs.48 FEMA’s role will likely grow as storms become
more frequent and intense, placing a greater burden on the federal budget. The cost-effectiveness of its programs is therefore
likely to come under increasing scrutiny. This Part introduces
FEMA’s three mitigation-oriented programs. It then describes the
statutory and regulatory requirements governing CBA and the
methodology FEMA uses to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the
projects it funds.
A. FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Assistance Programs
Disaster policy in the United States is increasingly shifting
from a focus on recovery from individual disasters toward centralized mitigation planning. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, Congress took an ad hoc and reactive approach to flood
management, adopting new legislation after each disaster
struck.49 Recognizing the benefits of planning and preparation,

48 CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 10, at 12. Other sources of funding include the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Departments of Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, Defense, and Health and Human Services.
49 NATALIE KEEGAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R4047, FEMA’S HAZARD MITIGATION
GRANT PROGRAM: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 1 (2009). The rate of legislation was almost one
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Congress passed legislation in 1950 that shifted the power to declare disasters and coordinate the distribution of recovery funds
from Congress to the president.50 A series of increasingly expensive
natural disasters during the 1960s and ’70s induced Congress to
implement mitigation programs in an effort to limit future property
damage and loss of life. The 1988 Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act51 (Stafford Act) furthered
this goal by establishing the first federal mitigation program.52
Congress has since expanded on FEMA’s mitigation programs in
an effort to “reduce the risk to individuals and property from
natural hazards, while simultaneously reducing reliance on Federal disaster funds.”53 The need for mitigation has grown more
urgent as the National Flood Insurance Program (a government
insurance program administered by FEMA for property owners
in high-risk flood zones) has fallen further into debt.54 Furthermore, because FEMA is on the hook for recovery and rebuilding
costs to homeowners, renters, and businesses after a storm hits,
it is in the agency’s interest to minimize the amount that it pays
out by reducing risk to high-value properties.
While postdisaster recovery and rebuilding efforts currently
make up the majority of FEMA’s grant awards, this Comment focuses on mitigation efforts because of the agency’s increasing focus
on long-term risk reduction and because of mitigation projects’
greater potential to alter patterns of flood vulnerability. FEMA
administers three programs under the umbrella of HMA, each
with a slightly different purpose. The Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program (HMGP) implements mitigation measures during the reconstruction phase following a natural disaster.55 The Flood
act per year: Congress passed 128 disaster-assistance bills between 1803 and 1938. Id.
(citing 96 CONG. REC. H11,899–11,902 (daily ed. August 7, 1950) (statement of Rep. Hagen)).
50 See Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109 (1950).
51 Pub. L. No. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689 (1988) (amending Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat.
143 (1974)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5202).
52 KEEGAN, supra note 49, at 3. While FEMA was created by executive order by
President Jimmy Carter in 1979, the Stafford Act also expanded FEMA’s responsibilities.
See History of FEMA, FEMA, https://perma.cc/62QF-NJQX.
53 FEMA, supra note 12, at 1.
54 The program accumulated $24.6 billion in debt by 2017 before Congress canceled
$16 billion to pay for claims from Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. DIANE P. HORN,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10988, A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM 2 (2020). FEMA has also fallen under scrutiny for inadequately managing severe repetitive-loss properties—those that repeatedly flood. See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., FEMA IS NOT EFFECTIVELY ADMINISTERING A PROGRAM TO REDUCE OR ELIMINATE
DAMAGE TO SEVERE REPETITIVE LOSS PROPERTIES 6 (2020).
55 FEMA, supra note 12, at 4.
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Mitigation Assistance (FMA) Program aims to control specifically
those costs arising from federally subsidized flood insurance and
is therefore targeted at properties insured by such programs.56
Most recently, FEMA established the Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) program. Signaling the
agency’s shift toward prevention, the program seeks to “promote
a national culture of preparedness” by investing in infrastructure
protection that minimizes future losses.57 HMA funds may be used
for a variety of physical projects, including retrofitting, elevating,
or otherwise floodproofing buildings; building drainage and
stormwater management infrastructure; and constructing flood
barriers like dams, levees, and floodwalls.58 Applicants may also
use grant funds to administer voluntary “buyout” programs,
whereby local governments acquire and then demolish or relocate
properties located in flood plains. This allows the land to be converted into open space that serves as a flood buffer for remaining
homes.59
Multiple levels of government are involved in administering
FEMA’s grant programs. Grant applicants (including states, territories, and federally recognized tribes) solicit project proposals
from subapplicants (primarily state agencies or local governments).60 Applicants then submit project applications to FEMA,
which evaluates eligibility and makes award determinations. If
the applications are successful, state and tribal entities disburse
funds to local governing bodies for implementation. State and
local applicants must also contribute a share (typically 25%) of
the total project cost.61
Mitigation programs might soon see a large increase in funding
due to the COVID-19 pandemic. While the FMA Program receives
a steady flow of funding via flood insurance premiums,62 funding
56

44 C.F.R. § 78.1.
85 Fed. Reg. 20,291, 20,291–92 (Apr. 10, 2020). This regulation was authorized by
§ 1234 of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA), Pub. L. No. 115-254, 132 Stat.
3438 (2018) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5133).
58 FEMA, supra note 12, at 36.
59 Id. at 34.
60 Id. at 5.
61 Id. at 26. The cost share increases to 90% for “small impoverished communities,”
defined as “a community of 3,000 or fewer individuals that is economically disadvantaged,
as determined by the State in which the community is located and based on criteria established by the President.” 42 U.S.C. § 5133(a), (h)(2).
62 NICOLE T. CARTER, DIANE P. HORN, EUGENE BOYD, EVA LIPIEC, MEGAN STUBBS,
JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & ANNA E. NORMAND, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45017, FLOOD
RESILIENCE AND RISK REDUCTION: FEDERAL ASSISTANCE AND PROGRAMS 15 (2019).
57
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for the other two HMA programs is calculated as a percentage of
all recovery funds made available after a presidentially declared
disaster.63 President Biden has announced that funding dedicated
to the COVID-19 response—declared a nationwide emergency by
President Donald Trump—may be incorporated into this baseline
calculation. This may result in up to $10 billion being directed toward mitigation without the need for congressional authorization,64 a massive increase over the $500 million available in
BRIC’s first round of funding.65
B. FEMA’s Cost-Benefit Methodology
In order to be eligible for funding under any of the three HMA
programs, applicants must demonstrate that their projects are
cost-effective.66 While in some contexts cost-effectiveness implies
merely that a project incurs the fewest costs among alternatives
given a fixed quantity of benefits,67 FEMA has interpreted the
term more stringently to mean that projects must have benefits
outweighing their costs.68 Project applicants can meet this criterion
by demonstrating that their project has a positive benefit-cost ratio
calculated using a FEMA-approved methodology.69
63

Id. at 14–15; see also Pub. L. No. 115-254, § 1234, 132 Stat. 3641, 3462 (2018).
Christopher Flavelle, New U.S. Strategy Would Quickly Free Billions in Climate
Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2021), https://perma.cc/KFD4-8XRB.
65 FEMA, THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS): NOTICE OF FUNDING
OPPORTUNITY (NOFO) FY 2020 BUILDING RESILIENT INFRASTRUCTURE AND COMMUNITIES
4 (2020), https://perma.cc/Q6NM-3QCN.
66 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(a) (stating that HMGP funds may be used for “mitigation
measures which the President has determined are cost effective and which substantially
reduce the risk of, or increase resilience to, future damage, hardship, loss, or suffering in
any area affected by a major disaster”); 42 U.S.C. § 4104c(c)(2)(A)(i) (stating that FMA
funds may be used for “mitigation activities that the [FEMA director] determines are technically feasible and cost-effective”); 42 U.S.C. § 5133(b) (stating that BRIC funds may be
used “to assist in the implementation of predisaster hazard mitigation measures that are
cost-effective and are designed to reduce injuries, loss of life, and damage and destruction
of property”).
67 OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 33, at 5.
68 See KEEGAN, supra note 49, at 7; see also 44 C.F.R. § 206.434(c)(5)(ii) (requiring
that HMGP project applicants demonstrate that the project is cost-effective by showing
that it “[w]ill not cost more than the anticipated value of the reduction in both direct damages
and subsequent negative impacts to the area”); 44 C.F.R. § 78.11(a) (incorporating the
same definition of cost-effectiveness); FEMA, supra note 65, at 3 (requiring that BRIC
projects “have a benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of 1.0 or greater,” such that they “reduc[e] risk
and future disaster costs in excess of the cost of mitigation”).
69 FEMA, supra note 12, at 64. Under FEMA’s methodology, expected annual benefits (EABs) are equal to the expected annual damages before mitigation minus the expected annual damages after mitigation. The EAB is discounted over the life of the project
(at a rate set by OMB) to produce the net present value of expected annual benefits, which
64
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Under FEMA’s methodology, benefits are equal to the expected flood-related damages without mitigation minus expected
damages with mitigation.70 For example, if expected damages
from a flood in a certain coastal area are $10 million and mitigation measures could reduce these expected damages to $3 million,
the benefit of the mitigation measures would be assessed at
$7 million under FEMA’s methodology. FEMA counts as benefits
all the costs that would be averted by improved flood protection—
physical damage, loss of public services or facilities, injuries or
deaths, temporary housing costs, loss of business income, and
administrative costs.71 Benefits must have a direct relationship
to the proposed project and, therefore, do not include changes in
regional economic production, incomes, or employment resulting
from project construction.72 The expected benefits from a floodmitigation project are weighed against the expected costs of the
project. Eligible costs include construction costs, title searches,
permit applications, and maintenance costs.73 However, costs
such as a reduced tax base, indirect economic loss, and transfer
payments such as insurance premiums are not factored into
FEMA’s cost calculations.74
While FEMA’s distribution of HMA funds is not itself subject
to OMB oversight, the agency closely follows federal guidance in
evaluating project applications. FEMA requires CBA to be conducted in accordance with OMB Circular A-94,75 which directs
agencies on how to evaluate the economic impacts of proposed regulations.76 Like the presidential executive orders, this document
calls for the consideration of distributional outcomes, noting that
“[w]hen benefits and costs have significant distributional effects,
these effects should be analyzed and discussed, along with the
analysis of net present value.”77 However, this distributional
can be directly compared to the net present cost of mitigation. See FEMA, ENGINEERING
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES FOR RETROFITTING FLOOD-PRONE RESIDENTIAL
STRUCTURES, APPENDIX B: UNDERSTANDING THE FEMA BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
PROCESS B-2 to B-4 (2012).
70 FEMA, supra note 69, at B-2 (defining project benefits as “the future damages or
losses that are expected to be avoided as a result of the proposed mitigation project”).
71 FEMA, INTRODUCTION TO BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS INSTRUCTOR GUIDE UNIT 3:
THE BENEFIT-COST MODEL 3-9 to 3-23 (2019).
72 Id. at 3-24.
73 See id. at 3-27.
74 Id. at 3-28.
75 FEMA, supra note 12, at 64.
76 See generally OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 33.
77 Id. at 12.
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mandate is notably absent from FEMA’s guidance on CBA, which
simply requires applicants for flood-mitigation funds to document
that the benefits of the project outweigh the costs.78 This is consistent with the general disregard for distributional effects in federal regulatory analysis. President Bill Clinton’s Executive
Order 12,898, for example, required federal agencies to take disproportionate health and environmental impacts on minority or
low-income populations into account in rulemaking.79 This Order
has largely failed to influence agency behavior, however, including that of the Environmental Protection Agency.80 Similarly,
President Barack Obama’s Executive Order 13,563 instructed
agencies to consider intangible benefits like “equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts” in regulatory review.81
This, too, went mostly unheeded by regulatory agencies, as most
CBAs submitted to OMB relied simply on the monetized benefits
outweighing the costs.82 These examples suggest a reluctance
across the federal government to step outside the bounds of CBA
as traditionally practiced.
FEMA has begun to lay the groundwork for a more holistic
approach to risk assessment. The agency recently developed a
National Risk Index (NRI) to “help identify communities most at
risk for natural hazards.”83 The NRI measures three aspects of
natural hazard risk: social vulnerability, community resilience,
and expected annual loss.84 FEMA defines social vulnerability as
the “social, economic, demographic, and housing characteristics”
that influence a community’s ability to cope and respond to natural
disasters.85 Community resilience measures a community’s ability
“to prepare for anticipated natural hazards, adapt to changing
conditions, and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions.”86 Finally, expected annual loss estimates the expected
78

See FEMA, supra note 12, at 44.
Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995).
80 See Richard L. Revesz, Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489, 1534–
40 (2018).
81 3 C.F.R. 216 (2012).
82 Id. at 1541–42.
83 FEMA, NATIONAL RISK INDEX TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION 1-1 (2020).
84 Id. at 4-1.
85 Id. FEMA uses the SVI developed by the Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute at the University of South Carolina, which incorporates twenty-nine socioeconomic
variables. See Social Vulnerability Index for the United States - 2010-2014, HAZARDS &
VULNERABILITY RSCH. INST., UNIV. OF S.C., https://perma.cc/5KFH-RKAR.
86 FEMA, supra note 83, at 4-3. The resilience index incorporates a community’s financial resources (including past mitigation funding and disaster aid recipience), physical
79
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monetary value of lost property, lives, and agriculture based on
historic losses and predicted annual frequency of storms, which
aligns most closely with the benefits currently measured by
FEMA’s CBA methodology.87 Each factor is combined into a total
risk score that FEMA recommends that emergency planners use
to update mitigation plans, communicate risk levels to homeowners and community members, support updates to building codes,
and “[p]rioritize and allocate resources.”88 As of yet, the NRI is
used “for planning purposes only” and does not replace the CBA
criteria.89 That is, while the NRI may assist applicants in selecting
which among already-eligible projects to prioritize, it does not alter
which projects qualify for funding in the first place. FEMA’s
openness to considering social vulnerability in the planning
stages sounds a hopeful note that it may be willing to adjust the
parameters of its CBA as well.
While FEMA’s cost-benefit policy as currently practiced has
the benefits of technical consistency across applicants, it operationalizes risk primarily in terms of immediate physical impacts. It
fails to capture long-term effects or effects that are not easily
quantified. Furthermore, the methodology fails to consider how
physical risk may interact with social vulnerability—the factors
that influence an individual or a community’s ability to return to
life as normal after disaster strikes. The next Part examines how
CBA as currently conducted results in pervasive disparities in
communities’ abilities to recover and respond to flooding.
III. THE IMPACT OF NATURAL DISASTERS ON SOCIAL
VULNERABILITY
To understand why the use of a facially neutral funding
formula like FEMA’s flood-mitigation grant methodology may exacerbate socioeconomic inequities, this Part examines the unequal landscape to which CBA is applied. It presents the concept
of social vulnerability as an alternative conception of risk to
averted property damage. It then presents evidence that FEMA’s
mitigation programs may sustain or even exacerbate existing
social vulnerability.
infrastructure, and government and social capacity and is based on the Baseline Resilience
Indicators for Communities index developed by the University of South Carolina. See Social Vulnerability Index for the United States - 2010-2014, supra note 85.
87 See FEMA, supra note 83, at 4-4 to 4-5.
88 Id. at 1-1.
89 Id. at 3-4.
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A. Social Vulnerability Influences a Community’s Ability to
Respond to Natural Disasters
FEMA’s cost-benefit methodology conceptualizes flood risk
primarily in terms of property damage, leading the agency to
neglect the social costs of disasters. Given that the agency is on
the hook for insurance payouts and rebuilding grants when
storms strike, it is rational for policy makers to minimize future
payouts by protecting high-value properties. This is especially
true given that low-income households are less likely to be covered by insurance, including from the National Flood Insurance
Policy program.90 However, this property-based approach evades
FEMA’s dual mandate under the Stafford Act to help local governments minimize both “damage” and “suffering” resulting from
disasters.91 That is, while FEMA’s programs effectively account
for the value of property and even lives lost due to flooding, they
fail to capture the many intangible harms that result when natural
disasters hit communities that lack a safety net. The fallout from
a devastating storm may cause suffering that lasts long after the
flooding recedes as individuals struggle to find safe and sanitary
housing, maintain or recover employment, and address health
issues. Yet, currently, FEMA’s policies best protect those individuals who have the economic security to avoid these long-term
consequences.
Though hazard risk is often framed in terms of the intensity of
natural disasters and the resulting damage to property, risk
might alternatively be thought of in terms of social vulnerability.
Social vulnerability is a concept developed by researchers of natural disasters to describe the socioeconomic factors that influence a community’s ability to respond to and recover from natural
hazards.92 Many factors influence vulnerability to flooding.
90 Lower-income homeowners are also less likely to have flood insurance and may
lack the necessary assets to secure loans to rebuild. The median income of the 3.3 million
individuals living in FEMA-designated flood zones who do not hold National Flood Insurance Policy policies is $37,000 less than that of the 1.8 million policyholders. See U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., AN AFFORDABILITY FRAMEWORK FOR THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM 11 (2018).
91 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b).
92 See generally Susan L. Cutter, Bryan J. Boruff & W. Lynn Shirley, Social Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 242 (2003). The SVI originally developed
by Professor Susan Cutter has been adapted by other researchers and government agencies, including the CDC. The CDC has developed its own version of the SVI to help identify
communities most vulnerable to natural disasters who may require additional supplies,
emergency personnel, evacuation planning, and emergency shelters. See CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7.
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Lower-income individuals who cannot afford to purchase their
own home are subject to landlords’ decisions regarding whether
to flood-proof apartments or rebuild after a storm.93 When storms
hit, the poor frequently lack access to a vehicle or the expendable
income necessary to evacuate.94 After a storm, those who work
low-wage jobs often do not have the flexibility to take time off to
recover or make repairs. And when flood-relief funds become
available, individuals with lower levels of education or political
engagement may lack the know-how to navigate complicated application forms.95 Race and ethnicity may also play a role, as
members of minority households—especially those who are non–
English speaking—may be less well connected to official sources
of information or distrustful of government instructions.96
Social vulnerabilities are often concentrated along geographic
lines and may be reinforced by patterns of disinvestment. There
is some evidence to suggest that areas that were historically redlined—denied federally backed mortgages due to the race of residents—currently face higher flood risks than areas that were
not.97 Redlined areas received less private investment in the housing stock and experienced lower home values in subsequent decades,98 an effect that may make it harder for them to qualify for
mitigation funding in the present. Low-income households are
more likely to seek out affordable housing in high-risk areas than
middle-income households, and they experience higher flood damages as a result.99 Indeed, neighborhoods tend to see a decline in
housing prices following storm damage, followed by an influx of
lower-income homeowners. However, households that relocate to
storm-ravaged areas tend to be more likely to default on their

93 Kathleen Tierney, Social Inequality, Hazards, and Disasters, in ON RISK AND
DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 109, 113–14 (Ronald J. Daniels et al.
eds., 2006).
94 Id. at 114–15.
95 See id. at 115.
96 Id. at 116–17.
97 Lily Katz, A Racist Past, a Flooded Future: Formerly Redlined Areas Have
$107 Billion Worth of Homes Facing High Flood Risk—25% More than Non-redlined Areas,
REDFIN NEWS (Mar. 14, 2021), https://perma.cc/52H2-NN75.
98 See Daniel Aaronson, Daniel Hartley & Bhashkar Mazumder, The Effects of the
1930s HOLC “Redlining” Maps 31 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2017-12,
Aug. 2020).
99 Camilo Sarmiento & Ted E. Miller, Inequities in Flood Management Protection
Outcomes, AM. AGRIC. ECON. ASS’N MEETINGS 12–15 (2006).
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mortgages and often pay higher interest rates than previous owners.100 Affordability therefore comes at the cost of security.
The concentration of vulnerable populations in high-risk areas
can fuel a cycle of neighborhood decline. When residents lack the
funds to rebuild after a storm, neighborhoods may see an increase
in blighted properties, higher residential and commercial vacancy
rates, and home prices that drop further still. This diminishes the
property tax base and squeezes the quality and quantity of
amenities that municipalities can provide.101 All of this suggests
that investments in flood mitigation may play a powerful role in
stemming the cycle of concentrated poverty. Conversely, policies
that disproportionately invest in high-property-value areas rather
than high vulnerability areas exacerbate inequality.
B. Relief Awards Based on Property Value Neglect Social
Vulnerability
FEMA’s flood-mitigation investments can widen the gap between different communities’ capacities to respond to natural
disasters. FEMA is more likely to protect areas with high property values and low social vulnerability. When decisions about
flood-mitigation investments are made based on property value
alone, communities with high levels of social vulnerability are
estimated to receive less infrastructure investment.102 And while
FEMA’s methodology does consider other factors like loss of life
and business income, empirical studies of the distribution of HMA
funds show that they are disproportionately directed toward
whiter and wealthier communities.103
While less socially vulnerable areas are more likely to be
fortified against flooding, high-social-vulnerability areas are
more likely to be abandoned.104 Under FEMA’s HMGP, even when
investment in protective infrastructure is not cost-effective,
properties may still be eligible for a voluntary buyout—a
100 Dimuthu Ratnadiwakara & Buvaneshwaran Venugopal, Do Areas Affected by
Flood Disasters Attract Lower-Income and Less Creditworthy Homeowners?, 29 J. HOUS.
RSCH. S121, S129 (2020).
101 Carolyn Kousky, Howard Kunreuther, Michael LaCour-Little & Susan Wachter,
Flood Risk and the U.S. Housing Market, 29 J. HOUS. RSCH. S4, S15–18 (2020).
102 Jeremy Martinich, James Neumann, Lindsay Ludwig & Lesley Jantarasami,
Risks of Sea Level Rise to Disadvantaged Communities in the United States, 18
MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOB. CHANGE 169, 177–79 (2013).
103 See Rebecca Hersher & Robert Benincasa, How Federal Disaster Money Favors the
Rich, NPR (Mar. 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/9Q6G-G4RS.
104 Martinich et al., supra note 102, at 178–79.
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government purchase that is subject to refusal, unlike eminent
domain—if they are deemed “[s]ubstantially [d]amaged.”105 This
standard is met if repairs would cost 50% or more of the prestorm
value and the property is located within a 100-year floodplain.106
Because low-value homes are more likely to be located in floodprone areas and to be poorly constructed (such that a lesser
amount of damage is necessary to constitute 50% of the home’s
value), these properties are more likely to be bought out.107 While
homeowners are allowed to rebuild in accordance with updated
building standards, the money received via the HMGP program
does not cover these additional improvements. Wealthier homeowners may have the private funds to be able to meet the more
stringent rebuilding requirements, but poorer homeowners are
often forced to relocate.108 Furthermore, if landlords do not receive
sufficient funds to rebuild rental units, renters from the area are
displaced.
Of course, receiving funds to relocate is better than receiving
no assistance at all. But moving has costs in the form of lost social
networks and employment opportunities. In some cases, flood
victims may even relocate to areas of equal or worse flood risk
and social vulnerability, including higher levels of poverty.109
What’s more, the distribution of FEMA aid may actually increase
inequality. Individuals with more resources to begin with are
better equipped to rebound from natural disasters and benefit
from aid receipt. In addition to recouping their prestorm property
holdings, wealthy individuals “may gain access to . . . new business
prospects supported by federal recovery investments; low-interest
loans; [and] significant payouts from public and private insurance
policies.”110 For those on unstable financial footing before a storm
hits, however, damage from flooding is “more likely to trigger
financial liabilities as a result of experiencing an increased likelihood of losing one’s job; having to move; paying higher rents due

105

See FEMA, supra note 12, at 65.
44 C.F.R. § 59.1.
107 A.R. Siders, Social Justice Implications of US Managed Retreat Buyout Programs,
152 CLIMATIC CHANGE 239, 249 (2018).
108 Id.
109 Devon McGhee, Were the Post-Sandy Staten Island Buyouts Successful in Reducing
National Vulnerability? 31–34 (Apr. 28, 2017) (master’s project) (on file with Duke
University Libraries).
110 Junia Howell & James R. Elliott, Damages Done: The Longitudinal Impacts of
Natural Hazards on Wealth Inequality in the United States, 66 SOC. PROBS. 448, 452 (2019).
106
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to reduced housing stock; and, dipping into already meager savings to compensate for such expenses.”111
Federal flood-relief programs provide an essential lifeline to
vulnerable communities. Yet this evidence suggests that they do
little to fix, and may in fact worsen, underlying social vulnerabilities to natural disasters. FEMA’s funding programs thus conflict
with the agency’s statutory mandate to “alleviate the suffering
and damage which result from [ ] disasters.”112 The next Part considers whether disparate outcomes resulting from FEMA’s use of
CBA may be successfully challenged in court.
IV. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO FEMA’S COST-BENEFIT
METHODOLOGY
Challenging the disparities that result from FEMA’s use of
CBA in court could benefit vulnerable homeowners and place
pressure on the agency to alter its methodology. The basic claim
would be that conditioning funding for flood-mitigation projects
on a cost-benefit ratio that relies primarily on property value has
a disparate impact on low-income residents or racial minorities,
who are more likely to possess (or rent) low-value homes. This
Part considers whether this claim could succeed under the Stafford
Act’s nondiscrimination provision, the Administrative Procedure
Act113 (APA), or the Fair Housing Act114 (FHA), all of which have
been used to challenge federal flood programs in the past. Ultimately, succeeding on any of these claims is unlikely, highlighting the lack of legal remedies for facially neutral policies that
compound longstanding inequities in resources and capacity.

111 Id. (citations omitted) (first citing James R. Elliott & Jeremy Pais, Race, Class,
and Hurricane Katrina: Social Differences in Human Response to Disaster, 35 SOC. SCI.
RSCH. 295 (2006); then citing James R. Elliott & Junia Howell, Beyond Disasters: A Longitudinal Analysis of Natural Hazards’ Unequal Impacts on Residential Instability, 95
SOC. FORCE 1181 (2017); and then citing Jacob Vigdor, The Economic Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 22 J. ECON. PERSPS. 134 (2008)). White residents in counties receiving more
FEMA aid between 1999 and 2013 accumulated up to $55,000 more wealth postdisaster
than comparable white individuals in counties receiving less aid. On the other hand, Black
and Latino individuals living in counties that received more aid accumulated $82,000 and
$65,000 less in wealth, respectively, than comparable Black and Latino residents living in
counties receiving less aid. Id. at 461.
112 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b).
113 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
114 Pub. L. No 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619).
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A. Litigating Under the Stafford Act’s Nondiscrimination
Provision
One initially promising avenue for challenging disparate
impacts resulting from FEMA’s implementation of CBA is the
Stafford Act’s nondiscrimination provision.115 The Stafford Act
mandates that any regulations implementing disaster programs
“include provisions for insuring that the distribution of supplies,
the processing of applications, and other relief and assistance activities shall be accomplished in an equitable and impartial manner, without discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion,
nationality, sex, age, disability, English proficiency, or economic
status.”116 On its face, the nondiscrimination provision offers more
protection than existing Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI117
doctrine because it includes economic status as a protected group.
This may offer homeowners an opportunity to challenge FEMA’s
funding decisions on the basis of economic-status discrimination
if they were denied mitigation funding due to a low benefit-cost
ratio.
However, while courts have recognized a private cause of
action under the Stafford Act’s nondiscrimination provision,118
no plaintiff has yet brought a successful claim.119 This is in large
part because courts have required a showing of discriminatory
intent on the part of FEMA.120 For instance, the Eastern District
of Louisiana dismissed an allegation that FEMA’s slow processing of applications for housing and rental assistance and its
promulgation of eligibility rules constituted economic-status discrimination.121 The court found no evidence of impermissible discrimination.122 Instead, it determined that any disparities in
115 See Hannah Perls, Note, U.S. Disaster Displacement in the Era of Climate Change:
Discrimination & Consultation Under the Stafford Act, 44 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 511, 540–
43 (2020).
116 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a).
117 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d–7. Title VI states that “[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
118 See Laday v. Ramada Plaza Hotel Laguardia, No. 07-CV-0450, 2007 WL 526613, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2007); see also Graham v. FEMA, 149 F.3d 997, 1004–05 (9th Cir. 1998).
119 Perls, supra note 115, at 540.
120 Id.
121 McWaters v. FEMA, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 823–24 (E.D. La. 2006).
122 Id. at 824. The court’s statement that evidence of “discriminatory animus” would
clearly violate § 5151(a), id., and the absence of any discussion of disparate impact suggests that the court assumed intent was required.
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funding resulted from FEMA’s administrative inefficiencies and
the fact that “inevitably those with economic resources will recover more quickly than those without.”123 Other courts have dismissed claims for failing to show that FEMA acted with discriminatory intent in denying applications for housing benefits124 and
disaster unemployment benefits.125 These analyses are consistent
with a general approach in U.S. antidiscrimination law that holds
agencies accountable for unequal treatment but not unequal outcomes. Ultimately, it would be difficult to demonstrate discriminatory intent in the administration of HMA funds pursuant to
FEMA’s cost-benefit methodology given that CBA is oriented toward
minimizing the costs to government rather than explicitly exclusionary goals.
B. Challenging FEMA Guidance Under the Administrative
Procedure Act
Alternatively, plaintiffs could challenge FEMA’s promulgation
of the cost-benefit guidance under the APA.126 The APA permits
judicial review of federal agency action unless a statute precludes
review or the action “is committed to agency discretion by law.”127
Unfortunately for any plaintiff wishing to challenge FEMA, the
Stafford Act falls within this exception. The statute expressly provides that “[t]he Federal Government shall not be liable for any
claim based upon the exercise or performance of or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty.”128 Courts
have found this provision “to preclude judicial review of all disaster
relief claims based upon the discretionary actions of federal employees.”129 This leaves the agency open to suit only for nondiscretionary actions or constitutional violations.130
123

Id.
Laday, 2007 WL 526613, at *2–3.
125 Maleche v. Solis, 692 F. Supp. 2d 679, 693 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
126 See Perls, supra note 115, at 542. Such a claim could perhaps allege that FEMA’s
guidance for conducting CBA is “an improper interpretation” of the Stafford Act and its
implementing regulations. See Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004, 1008–09 (11th Cir. 1987)
(challenging a rule defining eligibility for disaster unemployment benefits as inconsistent
with the relevant federal regulations).
127 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
128 42 U.S.C. § 5148.
129 See, e.g., Rosas, 826 F.2d at 1008.
130 McWaters, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 813; Rosas, 826 F.2d at 1008 (“There is no reason to
believe that Congress ever intended to commit to an agency’s discretion the question of
whether or not to act constitutionally.”); Lockett v. FEMA, 836 F. Supp. 847, 854–55 (S.D.
Fla. 1993) (holding that a court had jurisdiction over a due process claim as well as a
124
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Courts have generally found funding decisions under the
Stafford Act to be nonreviewable discretionary acts. For instance,
the D.C. Circuit held that FEMA’s promulgation of regulations to
carry out the postflood individual assistance program under the
Stafford Act was a discretionary function.131 In so doing, the court
considered whether the promulgation of the regulations involved
“an element of judgment or choice,” and whether the agency’s
“judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function was designed to shield.”132 Under this test, agency actions are nondiscretionary “when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically
prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow.”133 The D.C.
Circuit concluded that FEMA’s promulgation of regulations that
specified “criteria, standards, and procedures for determining eligibility for assistance” were actions that relied on FEMA’s “discretionary judgment” and permitted a wide “range of choice.”134
Therefore, judicial review was precluded. Other courts have similarly found that the promulgation of rules establishing eligibility
for disaster unemployment benefits,135 rules dictating how to calculate postflood reimbursements,136 and individual decisions regarding whether to fund postdisaster relief are discretionary
acts.137
These cases suggest that agencies given broad latitude to implement statutory and regulatory language are insulated from judicial review. The “cost-effective” language in the Stafford Act is
likely to be considered such discretionary language, rendering
nondiscrimination claim that implicated a due process right but not over a discretionary
decision to award funding).
131 Barbosa v. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., 916 F.3d 1068, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
132 Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315,
322–23 (1991)).
133 Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
134 Barbosa, 916 F.3d at 1070, 1073 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 5174(j)).
135 Rosas, 826 F.2d at 1009 & n.3 (holding that where the statute did not “contain any
guidelines for determining which workers are eligible for [unemployment] benefits and
which are not,” a rule defining an “unemployed worker” was “exactly the sort of exercise
of discretion that Congress intended to insulate from judicial review” (quoting 20 C.F.R.
§ 625.2(s))).
136 Columbus Reg’l Hosp. v. FEMA, 708 F.3d 893, 897–900 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding
that a decision to calculate payments based on depreciated value of equipment was discretionary given the lack of language mandating that the replacement value be used).
137 St. Tammany Parish ex rel. Davis v. FEMA, 556 F.3d 307, 323–24 (5th Cir. 2009)
(holding that FEMA’s decision not to dredge a canal was discretionary because language
stating that the federal government “may” and “is authorized” to provide assistance did
not create a mandatory funding obligation (emphasis omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5170b(a), 5173(a))).
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FEMA’s development of its cost-benefit guidance unreviewable.
The various sections of the Stafford Act authorizing the HMA
programs specify criteria for eligibility. Some of this language is
nondiscretionary. For instance, the section authorizing the
BRIC program specifies that “the President shall provide financial assistance only in States that have received a major disaster
declaration in the previous 7 years,” indicating that FEMA would
be subject to review if it did not comply with this particular requirement.138 The same section, however, provides that the president shall “take into account” other factors, including “the extent
to which prioritized, cost-effective mitigation activities . . . are
clearly identified.”139 It does not dictate how cost-effectiveness
should be evaluated, nor what weight it should be given relative
to the other factors. Unlike the major-disaster requirement, this
open-ended language suggests that FEMA has the discretion to
develop rules and policies implementing the cost-effectiveness
factor as it sees fit.
The regulations implementing the FMA Program are more
stringent. To be eligible for funding under this program, a project
must meet the cost-effectiveness requirement, meaning that it
will “not cost[ ] more than the anticipated value of the reduction in
both direct damages and subsequent negative impacts to the area
if future floods were to occur.”140 The implementing regulations for
the HMGP share the same language.141 Finally, the BRIC program requires that applicants’ projects “have a benefit-cost ratio
(BCR) of 1.0 or greater” such that they “reduc[e] risk and future
disaster costs in excess of the cost of mitigation.”142 While these
regulations do specify that benefits must outweigh costs, even
this leaves the specific costs and benefits to be considered undefined, suggesting that FEMA has discretion to include and exclude categories without being subject to judicial review. Ultimately, a judicial challenge to FEMA’s cost-benefit methodology
under the APA is likely to fail in the face of this discretionary
function exception. However, the indeterminacy of the statutory
and regulatory language also offers opportunities to advance redistributive goals by recategorizing what counts as a cost or a benefit, as Part V.A will describe.
138
139
140
141
142

42 U.S.C. § 5133(g).
42 U.S.C. § 5133(g).
44 C.F.R. § 78.11(a).
44 C.F.R. § 206.434(c)(5)(ii).
FEMA, supra note 65, at 3.
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C. Bringing a Disparate-Impact Claim Under the Fair
Housing Act
Given the difficulty of challenging FEMA’s funding decisions
or regulations directly, it is worth considering an alternative
pathway into court—challenging the state or local entity that submits projects to FEMA and ultimately distributes the funds. The
FHA offers an attractive avenue for litigation against these entities
because it allows for disparate-impact claims.143 Indeed, the FHA
has been used at least once to challenge disparate impacts resulting from a flood-recovery funding formula.144 However, unlike the
Stafford Act’s nondiscrimination provision, the FHA only covers
discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, [ ] national origin,” or disability—not economic status.145
Furthermore, the difficulty of demonstrating a statistical disparity in mitigation funding and the expansive defenses available
under current law ultimately make this a difficult claim to bring.
Courts have applied two provisions of the FHA to flood-related
claims. Section 3604(a) makes it illegal to “make unavailable or
deny” housing on the basis of a protected characteristic.146 This
language has been interpreted to require a showing of “constructive eviction.”147 Generally, this means that the plaintiff must
show that the “residence is ‘unfit for occupancy’” and that they
were “compelled to leave.”148 The D.C. Circuit, in Greater New
Orleans Fair Housing Action Center v. U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development,149 recognized a claim under this provision, alleging that a flood recovery grant formula developed by the
state of Louisiana and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) allocated disproportionately fewer funds to
Black homeowners than white homeowners after Hurricane
Katrina.150 The District Court concluded that § 3604(a) applied in

143 Tex. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. 576 U.S. 519, 545
(2015) (“The Court holds that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.”).
144 See Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. HUD, 639 F.3d 1078, 1081
(D.C. Cir. 2011).
145 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
146 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
147 Bloch v. Frischolz, 587 F.3d 771, 776 (7th Cir. 2009).
148 Id. at 777 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Constructive Eviction, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 594 (8th ed. 2004)). “[M]ere diminution in property values” is insufficient. Id.
149 639 F.3d 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
150 Id. at 1086. The grants were administered under HUD’s Community Development
Block Grant program. Id. at 1080.
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this case because the funding formula made it impossible for
“homeowners to inhabit their houses” by denying them sufficient
funds to rebuild.151 The D.C. Circuit analyzed the claims without
calling into question the appropriateness of using § 3604(a) to
challenge funding decisions.152 Therefore, while § 3604(a) may be
applicable to funding formulas in the mitigation context, it would
only apply in the situation that a home was rendered uninhabitable by lack of mitigation infrastructure. This could be the case
where homes are severely damaged or completely destroyed by
floodwaters that would have been contained by a drainage channel
or seawall. Because a lack of adequate mitigation may result in
substantial harm that does not rise to the level of total destruction,
however, the constructive-eviction requirement may limit the
circumstances in which this provision applies. Furthermore, the
funding at issue in Greater New Orleans was intended for repair
efforts after a storm had hit, making it easier for a homeowner to
claim that the failure to receive funds was a cause of their inability
to return home. Mitigation funding, on the other hand, is preventive in nature, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to trace past
funding decisions to the destructive effects of later storms.
In addition to the “make unavailable” provision, courts have
also applied § 3604(b) in the flood-infrastructure context. This
section prohibits discrimination “in the provision of services or facilities” connected to housing.153 Courts have interpreted
§ 3604(b) to extend to the discriminatory provision of municipal
services,154 including the failure to provide adequate flood protection to minority neighborhoods.155 A cost-benefit formula that
disproportionately allocates funding for flood infrastructure to
151 Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t Hous. & Urb. Dev., 723
F. Supp. 2d 14, 23 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 639 F.3d 1078 (D.C. Cir.
2011). The court inferred that the plaintiffs were unable to live in their homes based on
the “devastating effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita” and the fact that only those whose
homes were destroyed or significantly damaged were eligible for funds. Id. at 23 n.13.
152 See Greater New Orleans, 639 F.3d at 1085.
153 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
154 See Robert G. Schwemm, Cox, Halprin, and Discriminatory Municipal Services
Under the Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 717, 721 (2008) (noting that “[m]unicipalities
have always been understood to be proper defendants under the FHA”).
155 Lopez v. City of Dallas, No. 3:03-CV-2223-M, 2004 WL 2026804, at *8–9 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 9, 2004) (denying a motion to dismiss a § 3604(b) claim related to the discriminatory
provision of flood protection and stormwater-drainage facilities, among other services,
based on the race of homeowners); Miller v. City of Dallas, No. 3:98-CV-2955-D, 2002 WL
230834, at *14 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2002) (concluding that plaintiffs’ § 3604(b) claim—related to discriminatory provision of flood protection, streets, and drainage to a Black
neighborhood—could proceed).
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white neighborhoods, therefore, could plausibly constitute a
§ 3604(b) claim. This type of claim would perhaps be more advantageous than a claim brought under § 3604(a) because plaintiffs
could seek preemptive relief without needing to meet the high bar
of constructive eviction. Because this provision addresses the unequal allocation of resources rather than the availability of housing, it would likely apply to cases where homes are merely placed
at greater risk of destruction due to a lack of infrastructure investment. Focusing on the ex ante provision of services avoids the
difficulty of having to trace a causal link between past funding
decisions and the damage resulting from storms.
To succeed on a disparate-impact claim under either of these
provisions, a plaintiff would need to prevail under the three-step
burden-shifting test set out in Texas Department of Housing and
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,156
which was codified in a HUD rule in 2020.157 Under this test,
plaintiffs must allege the existence of a policy or practice that directly causes “a disproportionately adverse effect on members of
a protected class.”158 If the defendant demonstrates that the policy
“advances a valid interest,” the plaintiff may nevertheless prevail
by showing that these interests could be promoted through a less
discriminatory alternative.159
The defendant may also escape liability by demonstrating
that the policy “was reasonably necessary to comply with a thirdparty requirement,” such as federal, state, or local law; “[b]inding
or controlling” court and administrative orders; or “[b]inding or
controlling regulatory, administrative or government guidance or
requirement.”160 The existence of this defense makes it unlikely
that a plaintiff could hold a local entity accountable simply for requiring that project applicants comport with FEMA’s cost-benefit
156

576 U.S. 519 (2015).
HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85
Fed. Reg. 60,288, 60,288 (Sept. 24, 2020) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.500). President
Biden issued a memorandum ordering the secretary of HUD to “examine the effects” that
this rule has had on the implementation of the Fair Housing Act. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Memorandum on Redressing Our Nation’s and the Federal Government’s History of Discriminatory Housing Practices and Policies, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://perma.cc/ZS2K-BW7C. The review might lead to less stringent standards for bringing disparate-impact claims in the future.
158 Disparate Impact Standard, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(2) (2021); see also Inclusive
Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 543 (noting that the plaintiff must differentiate between the effect of
the policy and the “multiple factors that go into investment decisions”).
159 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2)–(3); see also Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 527.
160 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(d).
157
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methodology.161 However, were a state or local entity to impose its
own requirements for distributing funds, perhaps as a mechanism for prioritizing projects before they are even submitted to
FEMA, there might be a stronger case for holding the local entity
liable.
Even if the third-party-requirement defense were unavailable, establishing a statistical disparity caused by the cost-benefit
methodology would be a daunting task. Indeed, the homeowners
in Greater New Orleans failed on this point. The plaintiffs had
alleged that a grant formula that awarded applicants the lesser
of the pre-Katrina value of their home and the cost to rebuild
“ha[d] a discriminatory impact on African-American grantees living in historically segregated communities.”162 This was because
“generally African-Americans own homes with pre-storm values
that fall below the cost to rebuild, while whites living in predominantly white communities own comparable homes with prestorm values that exceed the cost to rebuild.”163 To establish a
prima facie case, the plaintiffs relied on a study that demonstrated
that Black homeowners faced a larger “resource gap” than white
homeowners due in large part to the use of the applicant’s home
value as a ceiling on grant payout.164
While evidence supported the claim that Black homeowners
were likely to have lower home values and therefore receive
smaller grants, the court dismissed the choice of the “resource gap”
metric for two reasons. First, the court stated that the plaintiffs
should have considered whether the disparity in property value
was counterbalanced by other provisions in the grant formula—
namely, that white applicants were more likely to see their grant
size reduced by their higher insurance payouts.165 Second, the
court held that the plaintiffs erred in focusing only on the applicants within New Orleans, who might not be representative of all
grant program applicants throughout Louisiana.166 Ultimately,

161 However, the fact that FEMA’s methodology is designed in accordance with Circular A-94, which itself is not binding on administrative agencies, might mean that its
methodology does not fall within this exception.
162 Greater New Orleans, 639 F.3d at 1089 (Rogers, J., concurring in part).
163 Id.
164 Id. at 1081 (majority opinion). The plaintiffs defined the “resource gap” as the cost
of rebuilding minus the total resources available for rebuilding, including insurance payouts and FEMA grants.
165 Id. at 1086.
166 Id. at 1086–87.
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the court concluded that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently established the existence of a disparate impact.167
Greater New Orleans demonstrates the difficulty of prevailing under a disparate-impact theory under current case law. A
plaintiff could feasibly demonstrate that FEMA’s cost-benefit criterion leads to disproportionately fewer mitigation projects being
constructed in primarily Black neighborhoods. Homes in majorityBlack neighborhoods are valued at about half the price of homes
in neighborhoods with no Black residents.168 Based on the findings
in Part III.B, low property values mean that Black neighborhoods
likely receive fewer infrastructure investments, though residents
may be more likely to receive property buyouts. The D.C. Circuit
concluded that the deduction of insurance payouts from white recipients’ grant totals counterbalanced the lower market values
that Black recipients’ grants were based on. Following similar
logic, a court could conclude that the existence of the buyout option
constitutes a “compensating factor” negating the disparity in infrastructure investment, even if recipients of buyout funds might
prefer to stay within their communities. Additionally, a plaintiff
may have a difficult time demonstrating that there is a “robust
causal link” between the use of CBA to award flood-mitigation
funds and disparities in flood protection, as required under Inclusive
Communities and the HUD Guidance.169 For instance, a defendant municipality might argue that racial disparities in flood-risk
exposure are caused in part by self-selection of Black residents
into more affordable—and flood-prone—neighborhoods. It may be
difficult to disentangle the impact of the CBA policy from other
factors that contribute to racially segregated risk exposure.
Finally, current HUD guidance allows defendants in a disparateimpact case to demonstrate that their policy “advances a valid interest,” which may be rebutted on the showing that this interest
could be promoted through a less discriminatory alternative.170 A
municipality would likely contend that its policy of protecting
high-value properties is warranted by the “valid interest” of preserving the local tax base. However, this argument might be less
convincing were a court to view the purpose of flood-mitigation
programs as reducing the human suffering associated with
167

Greater New Orleans, 639 F.3d at 1088.
ANDRE PERRY, JONATHAN ROTHWELL & DAVID HARSHBARGER, THE DEVALUATION
OF ASSETS IN BLACK NEIGHBORHOODS: THE CASE OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY 11 (2018).
169 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(3); see also Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 542.
170 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2)–(3); see also Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 527.
168
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flooding in addition to protecting property holdings. Additionally,
a plaintiff could contend that incorporating social vulnerability
into CBA is at least “equally [as] effective”171 as the current
methodology because it more accurately captures real costs to the
government that are currently going uncounted. Taking into account social vulnerability need not impose “materially greater
costs”172 than CBA as currently conducted. For instance, adopting
an approach like Harris County’s weighting of social vulnerability
would not necessarily require expensive data collection or calculations, given the existence of data sources like the SVI.173 Ultimately, the success of a disparate-impact claim may depend on
how stringently the requirements of Inclusive Communities and
the HUD rule are enforced.
This Part has considered three potential avenues for challenging the distribution of flood-mitigation funding via the courts.
Ultimately, however, altering FEMA’s cost-benefit policy directly
is a more desirable way of incorporating distributional considerations into flood-mitigation programs for several reasons. First, altering FEMA’s methodology provides a comprehensive solution
whereas litigation is piecemeal. Second, it offers benefits to those
who may lack the income or willingness to go to court. And third,
it forces FEMA to better address aspects of social vulnerability
that are not protected under antidiscrimination law, including
language, rental status, access to and trust in government, and
income. The next Part examines several such improvements that
could be made.
V. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
METHODOLOGY
The previous Part determined that courts are unlikely to offer
relief to those who have failed to qualify for access to FEMA’s
flood-mitigation funds. This Part proposes that policy change is a
more promising avenue, especially given a renewed focus at the
federal level on incorporating equity considerations into regulatory
decision-making.174 While some have advocated for doing away
with CBA altogether,175 CBA offers the advantages of
171

24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3).
24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3).
173 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7.
174 See Biden, supra note 28.
175 See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and
Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform,
172
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transparency, accountability, and direct comparison of alternatives.176 Furthermore, CBA is so entrenched in the federal government’s approach toward regulation that adjusting the existing
framework is likely the most politically feasible path forward.
This is especially true as climate change increases the cost and
frequency of natural disasters and the government resources
available to respond stretch thin. Difficult choices about which
areas ought to be protected lie ahead, and CBA offers a pragmatic
approach to ranking the options.177 Finally, as Part I noted, federal guidance already recommends the incorporation of distributive concerns in regulatory decision-making, guidance that has
long gone unheeded. FEMA is therefore well-positioned to adopt
one or more of the following solutions: (1) expanding the categories of benefits, (2) weighting costs and benefits to account for
wealth effects, (3) implementing a multifactor analysis that considers distributional concerns, (4) integrating social vulnerability
into long-term planning, and (5) providing support for those who
must relocate. Each of these solutions could be implemented by
adopting new interpretations of existing statutes and regulations
or issuing new regulations.
A. Expanding the Bounds of Benefits
To better account for the social effects of flooding, FEMA
should reconsider what counts as a benefit in its analysis of floodmitigation projects. This solution would have the advantage of
conforming to the existing language in the Stafford Act and its
implementing regulations, which simply require that mitigation
projects be “cost-effective” without specifying precisely which

32 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 1, 8, 66–94 (2005) (advocating for the feasibility principle as a
superior means to CBA for taking into account the distribution of costs, at least in the
context of technology-based regulation); Adler & Posner, supra note 38, at 168 (discussing
risk-risk analysis and direct interpersonal welfare comparisons as potentially more costly
alternatives); Bronsteen et al., supra note 41, at 1616–44 (proposing “well-being analysis”
as an alternative that focuses on quality of life).
176 See Adler & Posner, supra note 38, at 175.
177 Of course, this does not preclude efforts to increase the quantity of resources available for widespread emergency planning. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005, 1035 (2000):
[S]ome things are exceedingly costly at the present time because of past injustice, or corruption, or laziness. . . . So keeping our eyes on the costs should not
be permitted to deter us from asking why something that seems quite important
is, or has become, terribly costly: who has put the costs up so high?
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benefits and costs may or must be considered.178 In fact, the regulations implementing the HMGP specify that projects must both
be cost-effective and “substantially reduce the risk of future damage, hardship, loss, or suffering resulting from a major disaster.”179 This language suggests that considering longer-term, indirect effects may be appropriate and that both physical damages
and less-tangible individual hardships may be incorporated.
In fact, FEMA has previously expanded its methodology to
account for new benefits. Generally, FEMA only considers the
value of averted property damage, loss of use of public facilities
and infrastructure, fatalities or injuries, shelter for displaced
persons, lost business income, and emergency costs like debris removal.180 However, for some projects where benefits fall just short
of costs using these traditional metrics, FEMA allows applicants
to add certain social and environmental benefits to their tally in
order to push the project over the cost-effectiveness threshold.181
Social benefits include the avoided mental stress, anxiety, and
lost productivity that would otherwise result from flooding.182
Environmental benefits quantify the value of protecting and restoring natural habitats, including aesthetic improvements, air
and water quality, and recreation and tourism.183
While these categories are narrowly defined, they demonstrate
FEMA’s willingness to expand its evaluation of project outcomes
beyond physical harm alone. In fact, in the first round of funding
under the BRIC program, FEMA encouraged applicants to include
“ancillary benefits” such as “economic opportunity, reduced social
vulnerability, cultural resources, public health, [and] mental
health” in their applications.184 These benefits are currently only
considered after a project has already met the cost-effectiveness
threshold based on the standard methodology.185 FEMA could
take this approach one step further by allowing a broader range
of benefits to be counted within the formal CBA itself.
178

See supra Part II.
44 C.F.R. § 206.434(c)(5).
180 See FEMA, supra note 71, at 3-9 to 3-19.
181 Id. at 3-20.
182 Id. at 3-21. FEMA has assigned a value of $2,443 per person for avoided mental
stress and anxiety and $8,736 per person for avoided lost wages. Id. at tbl.3.
183 See FEMA, CONSIDERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS IN THE EVALUATION OF
ACQUISITION PROJECTS UNDER THE HAZARD MITIGATION ASSISTANCE (HMA) PROGRAMS 2
(2013). FEMA has assigned a yearly value, per acre, to green open space, riparian space,
wetlands, forest, and marine and estuary space. FEMA, supra note 71, at 3-23.
184 FEMA, BRIC QUALITATIVE CRITERIA 3–4 (2020).
185 FEMA, supra note 65, at 7–8, 19.
179
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As just three examples of potential benefits, FEMA could
measure the value of unemployment services, homelessness services, and toxic-waste cleanup prevented by investing in flood
infrastructure.186 All three would better account for impacts to socially vulnerable populations than the current methodology,
which disproportionately benefits those living in high-propertyvalue areas. Wage workers who are temporarily dislocated after
a storm may be more vulnerable to losing their jobs than salaried
employees.187 Were applicants for HMA grants allowed to measure
the value of unemployment payouts prevented by protecting
homes, this would add a larger boost than currently provided to
projects in areas that have a high population of wage workers.
Similarly, lower-income individuals are less likely to have insurance or savings and may be more vulnerable to homelessness
following destructive storms, which may lead to additional burdens
placed on other government services.188 Were FEMA to incorporate
the benefits of preventing storm-induced homelessness when
evaluating a flood-mitigation project, projects protecting homes
in lower-income areas would be more likely to qualify. Finally,
flooding frequently leads to toxic spills from industrial sites,
which are disproportionately located in low-income neighborhoods.189 If CBA accounted for the remediation or health costs
avoided by building flood infrastructure near industrial sites, these
benefits would more likely accrue to lower-income neighborhoods.
Of course, selecting which benefits to include implicates difficult judgment calls about which social costs are most significant,
and FEMA’s ability to incorporate new variables may be limited
by the data sources that it can access. However, if we accept that
the social effects of flooding should be accounted for in addition to
property damage and that FEMA’s methodology currently undercounts these effects, then incorporating at least some new categories of benefits is likely to lead to an increase in investment in
186 As a reminder, these would be counted as benefits under FEMA’s methodology
because benefits include costs avoided by investing in mitigation.
187 Tierney, supra note 93, at 115. The Disaster Unemployment Assistance program
currently offers benefits to those who have lost their job “as a direct result of a major
disaster.” Disaster Unemployment Assistance, BENEFITS.GOV, https://perma.cc/XY5S-9TZM.
188 See, e.g., Jeremy Hobson, How New Orleans Reduced Its Homelessness Population
by 90 Percent, WBUR (Feb. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/W4J5-PVCH (describing the increase in homelessness following Hurricane Katrina and the costs associated with the
criminal justice system and emergency medical care).
189 Brie Sherwin, After the Storm: The Importance of Acknowledging Environmental
Justice in Sustainable Development and Disaster Preparedness, 29 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y
F. 273, 283 (2019).
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communities who are most vulnerable to flooding. This investment could ultimately reduce the long-term burdens on local and
federal government to support individuals whose lives are significantly disrupted by a storm. Even if reducing monetary payouts
by the government were the only end FEMA pursued via flood
mitigation, paying more to protect socially vulnerable neighborhoods upfront may be cost-justified in the long run.
B. Altering the Weights Assigned to Costs and Benefits
As an alternative to including new categories of benefits
within its CBA, FEMA could simply weigh the existing categories
differently. Again, there is precedent for such an approach. In
2013, as one facet of FEMA’s Climate Change Adaptation Policy,190
the agency issued a new policy that permitted (but did not mandate) project applicants to incorporate sea level rise into their estimates of future flood damages.191 Previously, FEMA had projected the frequency and severity of flooding based on historical
data, without accounting for the likelihood that climate change
would worsen outcomes. By incorporating expected sea level rise
into the flood-risk model, FEMA effectively applied a greater
weight to the benefits of projects built in areas that were likely to
see the greatest increase in climate change–induced flooding.
Flood-mitigation interventions in these areas became more valuable as the likelihood and intensity of future storms increased.
FEMA could make an analogous adjustment by applying
distributional weights when conducting CBA. This approach
seeks to compensate for the fact that an additional dollar saved
or lost produces a smaller welfare change for a rich person than
for a poor person.192 Distributional weights counteract wealth effects by weighing benefits and costs experienced by lower-income
individuals more heavily than those benefits and costs accruing
to higher-income individuals.193 Under ideal circumstances, this
190 FEMA, ADMINISTRATOR POLICY, FEMA CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION POLICY
STATEMENT 2011-OPPA-01 (2012). FEMA’s policy was itself influenced by President
Obama’s Executive Order on Climate Change. Exec. Order No. 13,514, 3 C.F.R. 248 (2010).
191 FEMA, INCORPORATING SEA LEVEL RISE (SLR) INTO HAZARD MITIGATION
ASSISTANCE (HMA) BENEFIT COST-ANALYSIS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS) 2 (2013).
192 See, e.g., Bronsteen, supra note 41, at 1654. For an explanation of the use of distributional weights in CBA, see generally Matthew D. Adler, Benefit–Cost Analysis and
Distributional Weights: An Overview, 10 REV. ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y 264 (2016).
193 See, e.g., Jarl Kind, W.J. Wouter Botzen & Jeroen C.J.H. Aerts, Accounting for
Risk Aversion, Income Distribution and Social Welfare in Cost-Benefit Analysis for Flood
Risk Management, 8 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 7 (2017) (“Methodologies to use equity
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would require calculating the welfare each person receives from
each additional dollar, a calculation that is analytically costly and
for which there is currently no widely adopted method.194 However, there are examples of distributional weights being put into
action, and the idea is generating increasing support among both
academics and policy makers.
For instance, FEMA could adopt the approach used by the
British equivalent of OMB. The Treasury Department in the
United Kingdom recommends the use of weights in its guidance
document for evaluating regulatory actions (akin to Executive
Order 12,886 in the United States).195 This guidance recommends
that for projects with large distributive effects, agencies divide
the affected population into quintiles based on income and household size. Benefits and costs accruing to lower quintiles are
weighted more heavily.196 Given recent calls for distributional
weights to be incorporated into climate policy in the United
States,197 it is feasible that a workable estimate for the marginal
utility of money might be approved for regulatory analysis. If so,
FEMA could apply a similar quintile-based method to weight the
benefits of mitigation projects accruing to low-wealth areas more
heavily. This would increase the likelihood that the investments
in flood mitigation in low-income neighborhoods would be eligible
for funding.
An alternative intervention with a basis in U.S. practice
would be for FEMA to incorporate the subjective benefits of homeownership into property values. This approximates the goal of
distributional weighting by attempting to measure the welfare
benefits associated with property ownership. Currently, FEMA
calculates the benefit of averted property damage based on the

weights in CBAs were developed and promoted in the past, including by organizations like
the World Bank and the United Nations, where higher weights were assigned to cost and
benefits for low income groups, and lower weights for high income groups.” (first citing R.
Layard, G. Mayraz & S. Nickell, The Marginal Utility of Income 25 (CEP, Discussion Paper
No. 784, 2007); and then citing PARTHA DASGUPTA, AMARTYA SEN & STEPHEN MARGLINE,
GUIDELINES FOR PROJECT EVALUATION (1972)).
194 Adler & Posner, supra note 38, at 193.
195 H.M. TREASURY, THE GREEN BOOK: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT GUIDANCE ON
APPRAISAL AND EVALUATION 9 (2020).
196 See id. at 97–98. Empirical evidence suggests that the value of an additional unit
of income is roughly halved as income doubles. Id. at 94–95.
197 See, e.g., Tamma Carleton & Michael Greenstone, Updating the United States Government’s Social Cost of Carbon 30 (Energy Pol’y Inst. at Univ. of Chi., Working Paper
No. 2021-04, 2021).
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cost to rebuild.198 However, this fails to differentiate between projects that protect primary residences and those that protect investment properties or secondary vacation homes, treating luxury
or commodity housing as equivalent to shelter.199 Literature on
just compensation for takings has acknowledged the importance
of valuing homeowners’ subjective attachment to their homes,200
as well as the costs that property dispossession poses to personhood, autonomy,201 and one’s sense of community.202 Indeed, the
federal government offers “bonus” payments above the market
value for properties relocated as part of federal programs to account for this subjective value.203 FEMA could therefore adjust its
calculation of property value by adding subjective value to the
cost of rebuilding. This could perhaps be scaled based on years of
occupancy204 and would only be available for primary residences.
Were FEMA to more heavily weight the benefits associated with
protecting primary homes in this way, infrastructure investments
that protect properties that are essential for well-being and shelter would be more likely to qualify for protection.
C. Transforming Cost-Benefit Analysis into a Multifactor
Analysis
While both previous proposals collapsed distributive considerations into a single benefit-cost ratio, FEMA could also transform
CBA into one component of a multifactor analysis. Considering
CBA alongside other criteria is consistent with the language in
the Stafford Act that provides that mitigation projects both be
“cost-effective” and “substantially reduce the risk of, or increase
resilience to, future damage, hardship, loss, or suffering in any
area affected by a major disaster.”205 This approach would involve
considering the distributional implications of a policy alongside
its overall efficiency gains. Most simply, FEMA could require that

198

See FEMA, supra note 71, at 3-10.
OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 54, at 13.
200 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 736–37 (1973) (noting that market
value fails to capture a homeowner’s “experience in using [a] particular house and sentimental memories connected to it”).
201 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 960 (1982).
202 Ernest Norton Tooby, Note, The Interest in Rootedness: Family Relocation and an
Approach to Full Indemnity, 21 STAN. L. REV. 801, 814–15 (1969).
203 See Ellickson, supra note 200, at 737 n.195.
204 Id. at 736–37.
205 42 U.S.C. 5170c(a).
199
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project applicants submit a qualitative description of the demographic characteristics of populations benefitting from a proposed
project. This would align with Circular A-94, which states that
“[w]hen benefits and costs have significant distributional effects,
these effects should be analyzed and discussed, along with the
analysis of net present value” of the proposed project.206
To add teeth to the distributional analysis, FEMA could make
distribution of benefits a criterion for project evaluation, similar
to the approach used in Harris County. As mentioned in the Introduction, Harris County has adopted a prioritization framework
for distributing flood-mitigation funds that rates projects on a
scale from one to ten across eight categories.207 The factors—including flood-risk reduction, project efficiency, and social vulnerability—are then weighted and summed into a composite score
that is used to prioritize the order of construction.208
FEMA could easily replace its current method of conducting
CBA with a composite score that incorporates the NRI factors,
described in Part II.B. To evaluate the effectiveness of a project,
FEMA could substitute the expected annual loss component of the
NRI with FEMA’s current cost-benefit methodology. This value
would then be added to the scores for social vulnerability and
community resilience, with each assigned a weight according to
its relative importance. In setting this weight, it would likely be
important to facilitate public input on the relative priorities of
different factors from affected residents. Rather than require that
projects’ benefits strictly outweigh their costs, FEMA could instead set a threshold score that projects must reach in order to
receive HMA funding.
There are many benefits to the multifactor approach. First, it
encourages deliberation around the relative weight applied to economic efficiency and social vulnerability. Rather than attempting
to collapse value judgments into a single monetized form, a
206 OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 33, at 12. Circular A-94 suggests analyzing
distributional effects by grouping individuals or households by income, geographic region,
or demographic group. Id.
207 Because these funds were raised via a 2018 bond measure, they are not subject to
FEMA’s requirements unless they are used as matching funds.
208 See generally HARRIS CNTY. FLOOD CONTROL DIST., supra note 5. Flood-risk reduction is calculated as the number of structures removed from the floodplain as a result of
the infrastructure project and is weighted most heavily (25% of the composite score). Project efficiency is defined as the total cost of the project divided by the number of structures
benefited and is weighted as 10% of the total score. Social vulnerability is derived from
“15 U.S. Census variables that influence a community’s ability to prepare for, respond to,
and recover from a disaster” and is weighted at 20%. Id. at 4–6.
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multifactor analysis makes clear the various value judgments at
play. This increases the likelihood that members of the public can
hold officials accountable for the trade-offs they make in deciding
which areas to protect.209 Furthermore, highlighting distribution
as a separate consideration in the decision-making process serves
an expressive function by orienting social expectations around the
distribution of resources in a more egalitarian direction.210 Finally, the multifactor approach is supported by federal guidance
under Circular A-94, which acknowledges that where policies are
“intended to benefit a specified subgroup of the population,” the
CBA “should consider how effective the policy is in reaching its
targeted group.”211 Separately analyzing the impacts on socially
vulnerable populations, rather than folding these into a single
metric, is more consistent with this guidance. Compared to the
first two solutions, which ensure that the output of CBA more accurately reflects welfare impacts of flood mitigation, a multifactor
approach instead seeks to place less emphasis on CBA in the overall decision-making process.
D. Incorporating Distributional Considerations into Long-Term
Planning
Given FEMA’s increased focus on long-term risk reduction,
the agency might also consider requiring project applicants to develop mitigation plans for reducing social vulnerability. All project applicants to the three HMA programs are required to have
a FEMA-approved mitigation plan in place to be eligible for
funds.212 These plans must include a risk assessment that describes the natural hazards affecting a region and the region’s
vulnerability to those hazards. Vulnerability is currently defined exclusively in terms of physical damage to buildings, infrastructure, and facilities located in hazardous areas.213 Plans must
also include a mitigation strategy to reduce these potential
losses.214 FEMA could therefore adjust its regulations to require
that hazard mitigation plans more proactively address social
vulnerabilities.
209

See Adler & Posner, supra note 38, at 193 n.80.
See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 756
n.39 (1999).
211 OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 33, at 12.
212 Mitigation Planning and Grants, FEMA (Oct. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/MP25-JF39.
213 44 C.F.R. § 201.6(c)(2)(ii)(A)–(C).
214 44 C.F.R. § 201.6(c)(2)–(3).
210
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To do this, FEMA could require applicants to utilize the NRI
described above in completing their risk assessments. That is,
project applicants would be required to assess not just the value
of property at risk of flooding but also the social factors that influence an affected community’s ability to respond. As a condition
of funding, FEMA would require that applicants adopt mitigation
strategies that prioritize investments in communities with the
highest social vulnerability. As opposed to the permissive approaches laid out in Part V.A–C, which seek to increase the likelihood that applicants from high-vulnerability areas qualify for
funds, this strategy mandates that all jurisdictions adopt a distributional focus. Therefore, it would likely be a less politically feasible option, assuming that there are strong vested interests in
the allocation of funds to high-value areas.
Because state and local entities include lists of proposed projects when submitting their mitigation plans, FEMA might also
expand the eligible geographic scope of what counts as a project.
FEMA generally categorizes a mitigation project as a construction
activity protecting properties within the same floodplain.215 This
means that projects are likely to be designed either at the building level or within a neighborhood that shares the same risk profile and similar property values. FEMA could instead require that
applicants submit a portfolio of projects within a given jurisdiction and evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the entire lot. This
would allow non-cost-effective investments in lower-value areas
of a city or county to be “subsidized” by the benefits received from
protecting higher-value areas. Approaching flood protection on a
city- or countywide scale also makes sense when considering that
flood damage in one neighborhood can diminish the overall tax
base that supports municipal services for the entire jurisdiction.
Therefore, distributing flood infrastructure more evenly may help
sustain property values in a way that benefits the entire area. Of
course, this approach is most likely to be utilized by municipalities that are independently motivated to redress inequities in
funding. Unlike a solution that alters the CBA criterion for all
applicants, the planning and prioritization approach requires municipalities to proactively adopt a focus on redistribution, which
may not be politically tenable in all areas. Furthermore, states or
municipalities could simply choose to include projects that fell

215 FEMA, WHAT IS A BENEFIT? GUIDANCE ON BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF HAZARD
MITIGATION PROJECTS 1-1 (2001).
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short of being cost-effective when evaluated on a project-level basis—but nevertheless already serve a relatively well-off community—in which case the potential for this method to reach highly
vulnerable households would be underutilized. To the extent that
some municipalities are currently frustrated by FEMA’s CBA criteria in their efforts to distribute flood funding more broadly,
however, evaluating cost-effectiveness at the regional scale provides a path forward.
E. Reducing the Costs Associated with Displacement
Finally, FEMA should consider how to ensure that its buyout
programs do not merely recreate patterns of unequal risk exposure. Continuing to invest in housing in flood-prone areas is not
a long-term solution. Ultimately, buyout programs are the most
cost-effective form of mitigation. Entire neighborhoods and cities
will eventually need to move from the coast as rising tides make
it impossible to effectively hold back flooding.216 All three of the
HMA programs currently fund property acquisitions. Acquisitions
are subject to the same cost-effectiveness criteria as investments
in mitigation infrastructure, though there is an exception for
properties under $250,000 and for those that are substantially
damaged. As mentioned in Part III.B, lower-value homes are
more likely to be considered “substantially damaged” and to become eligible for relocation, both because the property value is
lower to begin with and because the lack of mitigation infrastructure in low-value neighborhoods increases the damage resulting from storms.217 Yet lower-income households may be less
able to relocate to safer neighborhoods if they lack the resources or
knowledge to conduct widespread housing searches. They may also
be able to afford to live only in equally flood-prone or low-opportunity
areas. These relocation patterns are especially concerning given

216 See, e.g., Christopher Flavelle, U.S. Flood Strategy Shifts to ‘Unavoidable’ Relocation of Entire Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/JH2N-N832
(describing the shift toward funding large-scale buyouts of homes by state governments,
FEMA, HUD, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers); Jeffrey Arnold, Roger Pulwarty,
Robert Lempert, Kate Gordon, Katherine Greig, Cat Hawkins Hoffman, Dale Sands &
Caitlin Werrell, Reducing Risks Through Adaptation Actions, in 2 IMPACTS, RISKS, AND
ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT (David
Reidmiller et al. eds., 2018) (noting that “retreat will become an unavoidable option in
some areas of the U.S. coastline”), https://perma.cc/FZ3H-HYKK.
217 Siders, supra note 107, at 249.
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recent research indicating the long-term effects that neighborhood
quality has on lifetime earnings and well-being.218
To ensure that its buyout programs do not perpetuate social
vulnerability, FEMA could borrow a strategy from housingvoucher administration. Evidence from existing voucher programs
suggests that the recipients of housing vouchers tend to remain
in neighborhoods with low social mobility. However, the Seattle
Housing Authority recently implemented a program that provided voucher recipients with personalized financial support and
advice, including information on “opportunity bargain” neighborhoods that have low housing prices but high social mobility.219 The
counseling program produced a large increase in voucher holders
who voluntarily moved to these higher-opportunity areas.220
FEMA might consider implementing similar measures. If lowerwealth households are forced to relocate rather than stay in place,
they ought to be able to access affordable neighborhoods that are
not subject to flood risk. This solution presents an opportunity for
FEMA to proactively shape residential patterns such that patterns
of concentrated vulnerability and inequality are not reinscribed.
CONCLUSION
As a changing climate increases the likelihood of extreme
weather events, the federal government will play a larger and
more costly role in helping communities recover from natural
disasters. This Comment has highlighted how natural disasters
expose and exacerbate existing social inequalities and how the
use of seemingly neutral decision-making criteria can lead to disparate outcomes when operating on an unequal playing field. It
has identified ways in which FEMA’s methodology—by conceptualizing risk in terms of property loss—fails to capture the potentially vast social harms caused by flooding. In failing to account
for the long-term burdens to the government of supporting vulnerable communities when and after a storm hits, FEMA may actually fail to achieve its stated goal of cost-effectiveness.
218 See Peter Bergman, Raj Chetty, Stefanie DeLuca, Nathaniel Hendren, Lawrence
F. Katz & Christopher Palmer, Creating Moves to Opportunity: Experimental Evidence on
Barriers to Neighborhood Choice, 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 26164, 2020) (predicting that “moves from low- to high-opportunity Census tracts induced by [the experiment] will increase average undiscounted lifetime household incomes
by $214,000 (8.4%) for children who move at birth and stay in their new neighborhoods
throughout childhood”).
219 Id. at 9.
220 Id. at 2–3.
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Pursuing economic efficiency may also conflict with other important goals, such as fair and integrative access to housing or
economic opportunity.
The solutions proposed here seek both to improve the distributive outcomes of flood-mitigation policy and to draw attention to
the values that government agencies promote in their decisionmaking procedures. In this second goal, the solutions presented
here are not limited to FEMA. While federal agencies continue to
pursue economic efficiency without much regard for the distribution of policy burdens and benefits, this Comment proposes several
ways in which agencies can better measure and promote equitable outcomes. How the government defines, weighs, and communicates the costs and benefits of its policies reveals where its
priorities lie. While the federal government faces difficult tradeoffs between the costs to taxpayers of greater federal involvement
in flood mitigation and the effects of agency neglect on vulnerable
communities, this Comment suggests that acknowledging the full
social impacts of policies is an important step.
While mitigation resources ought to be apportioned equitably
in the short-term, large-scale relocation is likely inevitable for
most flood-prone communities over the coming decades. As in periods of massive demographic relocations that have come before,
the government has a powerful role to play in structuring how
communities and neighborhoods are resettled. Decisions on how
to spend federal funding can disrupt patterns of income, wealth,
and racial segregation and can create new opportunities for those
previously denied wealth-building opportunities to establish
firmer roots.

